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Abstract
This paper provides a short overview of some of the result, found in the recent empirical regional
growth literature. It is argued that, in a variety of data sets, there are string forces leading towards convergence.
Introduction
During the last tell years, there has been a revival of interest in force,, that lead to economic convergence.
This revival has been partly spurred by the renewed interest in the general topic of economic growth. A
significant contribution to this revival has been the proposal that the convergence hypothesis be used as the
main test to dillcrentiate the two main current approaches to economic growth: The neoclassical model and
the models of endogenous growth.
In this paper we will provide a short overview of some of the results found in the recent empirical
literature. We will argue that, in a variety of data sets, there are strong forces leading towards convergence.
We will then analyze different ways to account for these results. We will start with the neoclassical model
and discuss closed and open economy implications. We will then argue that measurement errors and policies
of the central government are not likely to be the main reason behind the observed convergence. We will
then see whether the one sector model of endogenous growth can be modified to predict convergence. We
allow for migration, endogenous fertility, capital mobility and technological diffusion and note that only the
latter is a potential candidate to explain the data. Finally, we interpret the empirical evidence in the light of
the two-sectors of endogenous growth.
Concepts of Convergence
13-cont'en t eo(c ter.ctts 6-'^^in ens e^tre°
The first thing we shall do is define what we mean by convergence. In trying to do this, we note that
there are many definitions used in the growth literature (see for example Quah ( 1993a)). We will use two
concepts which will be called a-convergence and 13-convergence (I ).
We will say that there is 0-convergenmce in a cross section of economies if we find a negative relation
between the growth rate of income per capita and the initial level of income (2). In other words, we say that
there is f3-convergence if poor economies tend to grow faster than wealthy economies. This concept of
convergence is often confused with an alternative definition of convergence, where the dispersion of real per
capita income across groups of economies tends to fall over time. This is what we call a-convergence.
(*) Yale University, UPF, CEPR and NBER
(**) 1 would like to thank Robert Barro, Michelle Connolly and Pam Tomaquct-i-Pernil for useful comments. Although
titsuro Shioji has not read this paper, the remaining errors are still his fault.
I This terminology was first introduced by Barro and Sala-i-Martin 119921,
2 This phenomenon is sometimes called ' regression to the mean'.
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\\e ,sill 11 -Lie I:Urr Ilya. 11i110LI'li nut idcnucaL the 5(01uncrpt, Of LuinCI E'rhLe arc echoed. Same
people have argued that the concept of /3-onvergence is irrelevant and the only thing of interest is s hether
economies move closer together it,, time goes by (Quah (1993a) makes this point forcefully in the context of
(;alton's fallacy: see also I•riednnut 11992)). We tend to disagree with this assessment, fur we believe that
both concepts of convergence are interesting. Let us illustrate why /3-convergence is interesting N ith an
example where (7-cronvereence is eliminated by construction. Consider the ordinal rankings of the NBA
teams over time. The dispersion of rankings is constant by definition. Sports analysts and N13A owners are
interested in questions such as how quickly the great teats revert to mediocrity„ or ,Iioss long dynasties
last in basketball''. For example, hors long did it take for the great Boston Celtics of the 1950s and 1960s and
the Los Angeles Lakers of the 198(1, to become average teams'' How long will it take for the Chicago Bulls
to go back to mediocrity now that the great Michael Jordan has retired (at least temporarily)?
The reverse is also interesting: How quickly do mediocre teams become great teams? For exaniple.
how long did it take to create the Celtics of the 1950s. the Lakers of the 1980s. or the Bulls of the 1990s? One
could even he interested in the type of policies the N13A could introduce to trails)orm had teams into great
teams in as little time as possible. For instance, we could ask whether the introduction of the draft accelerated
the convergence process.
To put an example closer to home, we could ask what mechanisms of the Spanish Soccer League let
two teams (Barcelona and Real Madrid) will the overwhelming majority of the titles. Once we identified
those mechanisms, we could think about ways to increase the competitiveness of the other teams, and as a
result, increase the aggregate interest on the league. I believe that these are all interesting questions. But note
that all of them refer to the concept of /3-convergence, not (T-convergence. In fact, reducing the cross-
sectional variance in it sports league would probably not make any sense (consider how interesting the
league would he if all teams tied fix first plaice every sin^_le year!).
Similar questions can he asked about economies. For example, it is interesting to know whether poor
countries are predicted to grow faster than rich ones. It is also interesting to know how fast the averag, poor
country becomes rich and how fast the average rich country becomes poor, independent of whether the
aggregate cross sectional variance is falling or rising. For instance, if we knew that poor countries will
become rich in just a few years, then we could even not care about whether the variance is large or small it,,
long it,, we knew that poor countries would escape poverty in very little time. Similarly (and unfortunately).
the analysis sunnrtarized heloss suggests that poor economies will he poor for it long time. Given this.
knosying whether the overall world dispersion gulls or not is of secondary importance. Iknee, it pressed to
sav which of the two concepts of convergence I find more interesting. I would probably choose -convergence
(although I emphasize that both concepts of convergence convey useful inlornutiun and, as it result. should
he studied).
The relation hcttr(,(.It P-( 'onrer,genre and (T--c ' O'i1,c1-gc1trt'
Although they are different animals, the two concepts of convergence are related. Suppose that /3
convergence hold, for it group of' region, i-I..... N. In discrete time, corresponding say to annual data, the
real per capita income for economy i can he approximated by
^t^ log(y 1=a+(I -^31.1ug(y^^)+u.
where it and h are constants, with 0<0 <I, and a is it disturbance term. The condition /3>0 implies /3-
convergence because the annual growth rate logy, /y I) is inversely related to the log(y,, ). A higher
coefficient /^-correspunds to it higher tendency toward convergence (3). The disturhance term picks up
tentporar, shocks to the production function. the ,axing rate. and so on. We assume that it has zero mean,
the same variance, cr ^a for all economies, and is independent over time and across economies.
` The condition B>I rules out leapfrogging or overshooting, where poor economics are systematically predicted to get
ahead of rich economies at future states
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Al, a measure of the anss-sectional dispersion of income. we take the sample variance of the log of
income
N
121 ^' _ (I/n) Ilog (Y^^)- µ^I
i=1
where p, is the sample nncan of Iog(y,). If N is large, then the sample variance is close to the population
variance, and we can use I I I to derive the evolution of o' over time:
131 6', =(I-/3)'.0'1+6
This is the first-order difference equation, which is stable if 0< 0<1. If there is no /3-convergence so
that /kO, then the cross-sectional variance increases over time. That is, if there is no /3-convergence, there
cannot he 0-convergence (in other words, /3-convergence is a necessary condition for (T-convergence).
The steady-state value of 6', is given by
( (7' ) * = 0 , . I 1-(I -/3 '1
The steady-state dispersion falls with /3 but rises with the variance 0' of the disturbance term. Note
that the steady-state dispersion is positive even if /3 is positive as long as 6' >0. We can solve the difference
equation 131 to find an expression of 0' over time:
141 0',=(0')*+(I -/3)?. I6'„ -((T')*1.
If /3-convergence holds so that /3>0, then 6', approaches its steady-state value ( (T' ) * monotonically.
The key point, however. is that 0'^ can increase or decrease toward the steady-state depending on whether
the initial value of 0' is above or helow the steady-state. Note in particular that 0 could he rising along the
transition even if /3>)). In other words, (convergence is not a sufficient condition for cs-convergence.
Suntntari/ing, /3-convergence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 0-convergence.
In the final section we will analyse empirical evidence on /3-convergence and (7-convergence separately.
In a series of recent papers. Danny Quail has proposed new ways ofjointly analyzing and using stochastic
kernels for the dynamics of the distribution of output or income per capita (see for example Quah I I993bI).'
Co,[lltio ral /3-t on en;) nc1,
Following 13arro and Sala-i-Martin ( 1991,1992) and Mankiw. Romer and Weil ( I992), we can also
distinguish conditional from absolute convergence. We say that a set of economies display conditional /3-
convergence if the partial correlation between growth and initial income is negative. In other words, if we
run across-sectional regression of growth on initial income, holding constant a numher of additional varia-
hlrs, and we find that the coefficient on initial income is negative, then we say that the economies in the data
set display conditional /3-convergence. If the coefficient on initial income is negative in a univariate regression
then we say that the data set displays ahsolute convergence.
In the regional data sets studied in this paper, we ignore the conditioning issue. 'there are two reasons
for this. Fitst, unlike the regressions involving cross-sections of countries, we find convergence in regional
data sets, even in the ahscence Of conditioning variables. Second, and perhaps more importantly, a variety of
studies have found that the estimates of /3 in regional data sets do not change substantially when the sets of
variables that are usually held constant in cross-country studies are included in the analysis (see for example
I3arro and Sala-i-Martin 11991, 19921.)
' Although Quah ( 1993) suggests that the convergence results found using his techniques across large cross-sections
of countries differ substantially from the results found in our cross-sectional analysis of IT and 13. his regional results fur
the States of the U.S. are not very different from ours (I thank Danny Quah tom communicating (orally) this result to me
while we were drinking beer at it bar in Brussels).
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Regional Data Sets
In a number of papers, Barro and Sala-i-Martin ( 1991, 1992a, I992h, 1994) have analyzed the
convergence properties of the regions within various countries. The results, extended to 1990, are reported in
Table I and Figures I to 10. Table I provides evidence on /3-convergence for the regions of the IJnited
States (48 contiguous states), Canada (10 provinces), Japan (47 prefectures) and Europe (nuts 2) (5). The
date, for which data are available for the different countries differ somewhat. For the United States we have
personal income annual data computed by the U.S. Commerce Department beginning in 1929 (See Bureau
of Economic Analysis ( 1986)). The concept of personal income used in these regional accounts corresponds
to the concept used in the national accounts. Thus, if we add personal income for each of the states, we
would get (at least theoretically) the U.S. aggregate figure for personal income (6). We use the figures that
exclude transfer payments. We expanded the data set with Easterlin's estimates of state personal income for
1880 (47 states and territories), 1900 (48 states and territories), and 1920 (48 states). These data also e' elude
transfer payments.
We do not have measures of price levels or price indexes for individual states. Therefore, we deflate the
nominal values for each state by the national consumer price index. Given that we use the same price deflator
for all states in a single year, the particular deflator that we use attects only the constant term in the empirical
analysis. Population data are from the Bureau of the Census (1990).
The data on income across Japanese prefectures are collected by the Economic Planning Agency i EPA)
of Japan and start in 1955. The prefectural income accounts are made by the respective prefectures on the
basis of the «1983 Standardized System of Prefectural Accounts,, so that income for all prefectures is
standardized. The data are collected annually (so there is no interpolation) by the EPA and published in the
,,Annual Report on Prefectural Accounts.,, The concepts of income used are adopted from the national
income statistics so the aggregate of prefectural incomes of all 47 prefectures are theoretically identical to
Japan's iwtional income. As was the case of the United States, we use national price indexes to deflate each
prefecture's income.
The data on population are prepared by the Statistics Bureau at the Management and Coordination
Agency. The principal source of these data are the quinquennial Population Censuses taken by the Statistics
Bureau. Data for intercensal years are computed by interpolation and use data on vital statistics and
interprefectural migration. The estimates correspond to the stock of population as of October I st each year.
We have data on GDP for regions in seven European countries (Germany, United Kingdom, France.
Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark), totaling 73 regions. Data for 1950, 196(1, and 1970 are taken
from Willem Molle. Data for 1966 (missing France and Denmark), 1970 (missing Denmark), 1974, 1980,
and 1985 are from Eurostat. The nominal figures on GDP are expressed using current exchange rates in
terms of it common currency unit. For the later years, the population data are collected by Eurostat.
We have expanded the European data set to include 17 regions (Comunitats Aut6nomes) of Spain. We
have Spanish data on personal income and gross domestic product by province for 50 provinces. The data
were then aggregated up to the level of the Comunitats, using the latest definition (the regional distribution
of provinces changed somewhere during the 1970s). Starting in 1955, the data were collected (almost)
biannually by the Banco de Bilbao and published in the ,,Spanish National Income and its Provincial
Distribution,, (Renta nacional espanola y su distribucion provincial).
Provincial population data are taken from the Spanish Statistical Abstract (Anuario estadistico de Es-
pana), published by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica.
This enormous data set is further expanded to include provincial personal income data for 10 Canadian
provinces for the period 1961-1990. The data were provided to us by Coulomhe and Lee (1993). The main
source of data for Canada is Cansim, which reports on annual personal income, as well as population fur the
10 provinces. The provincial personal income data is supposed to aggregate tip to the national totals. Unlike
any of the other countries, Canada collects price data by provinces. Hence, provincial rather than national
prices were used in this case.
For Spain, nuts 2 refers to Comunitats Auii nomes, not Provincies.
Note, however, that we exclude Alaska, Hawaii and the District of Columbia from our analysis.
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International 1?vidence on Regional Convergence
WC now use the regional data for the various countries to analyze regional Convergence in income per
capita. We can estimate the speed of convergence 03 by regressing the average growth rate of a set of regions
between times t„ and t +'I on the initial level of income. In order to estimate the speed of convergence
precisely, we estimate the nonlinear equation
,151 (l/f)log(v /y,)=a-[(I-elog(> I)+ill
where if represents the average of the error term. Lill. between the dates t„ and t„ +T.
Tai)Je I shows non-linear least-squares in the form 151 for 48 U.S. states for the period 1880 to 1990.
I?ach cell contains four numbers. The first is the estimate of P. Underneath (in parenthesis) we report its
standard error. To its right we report the adjusted R' of the regression and below the R', the standard error of
the regression (all equations have been estimated with constant terms, which are not reported in Table I ).
The first column reports the estimate of /3 for a single long sample ( 1880-1990). The point estimate is
0.0174 (s.e.=0.01126) (7). The large value of R' can also be appreciated by looking at Figure I. which is a
scatter plot of the average growth rate of income per capita between 1880 and 1990 versus the log of income
per capita in 1880.
fhe second column reports a panel data of 10 year regression (20 years for 1880 to 1990 and 1900 to
1920). We restrict the estimate of 03 over time, but we allow for time fixed effects. We also hold constant the
shares of income originated in agriculture and industry to proxy f o r sectoral shocks taht affect growth over
the short run.'1'hese variables turn out not to affect the estimates of /3 over the long run. The restricted point
estimate of 13 is 0.022 (s.e.=0.002).
Figure 2 shows the cross-sectional standard deviation for the log of per Capita personal income net of
transfers for 48 1 S. states from 1880 to 1992. We observe that the dispersion declined front 0.54 in 1880 to
Figure 1: Convergence of Personal Income across U.S. States.
1880 Personal Income and Income Growth from 1880 to 1990
FL VA
0.4 0.8 1.2
log of 1880 per capita personal income
1 .6 2
This regression includes 47 states or territories. Data for the Oklahoma territory was unavailahle tier 1880.
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Table I
Countries Lune.-Run Single Panel
Regression l'.stimates
R' /3
(s.e.) (s.e. Reg.) (s.e
United States 0.017 0.89 0.022
48 states (0.002) (0.0015) (0.002)
(I880-1990)
Japan 0.019 0.59 0.031
47 pretectures (0.004) (0.0027) (0.004)
(1955-1990)
Ftrope 0.015 - ((.018
90 regions (0.002) - (0.003)
(1950-1990)
Germany 0.014 0.55 ((.016
II regions ( 0.005) (0.0027) (0.006)
U K 0.030 0.61 0.029
11 reeions (0. 007) (0.0021 ) ( 0.009)
France 0.016 0.55 0.015
21 regions (0. 004) (0.0022 ) (0.003)
Italy 0.010 0.46 0.016
20 regions (0.003) (0.0031) (0.0(13)
Spain O. 023 0.63 0.019
17 regions ( 0.007) (0 . 004) (0.005)
(1955-1987)
Canada (1 .024 0.29
10 provinces (( ).005) (0.0025)
(1961-1991)
Notes to 'Id/le I: The regressions use non linear squares to estimate equations of the tones
(I/h)In(y)y ,)=a - Iln(y„)I(1-e'')(I/C) +other variables,
where y , , , is the per capita income in region i at the beginning of the interval divided by the overall CPI. T is the length of
the interval . ' Other variables ' are regional dummies and sectoral variables that hold constant temporary shocks that may
affect ttic performance of a region in a manner that is correlated A ith the initial level of income (recall that when the error
term is correlated with the explanatory variable, then the OtS estimate of 0 is biased.)
Each column contains fiver numbers. The first one is the estimane of /3. Underneath ( in parentheses) its standard
error . ' to its right , the adjusted k' of the regression and below the R. the standard error of the eqution . Thus, constant.
regional dummies and/or structural variables are not reported in the table. The coefficients for I[urope include one dummy
for each of the eight countries.
Column I reports the panel estimates sshen all the subperiods are assumed to have the same coefficient /3. This
e,stinwtion allows for time effects . For most countries. the restriction of /3 being constant over the suhperiods c.tnnot he
rejected ( See Barro and Sala-i - Martin 1199411.
Column 2 reports the value of /i estimated from a single cross section using the longest available data. For example,
for the ( tatted States, the coefficient /3 estimated by regressing the average growth rate hetween 1880 and 199)) is
/1=(1.022 (s.c.=1 ).01)02).
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Figure 2:
Dispersion of Personal Income across U.S. States, 1880-199',
0 .......... ^_.... _^^.._. , ..
1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
0.33 in 1922(1, but then rose to ((.40 in 1930. This rise reflects the adverse shock to agriculture during the
192))x: The agricultural states were relatively poor in 1920 and suffered it further reduction in income with
the Gall in agricultural prices. After 1930 , dispersion fell to 0 . 35 in 1940, 024 in 1950, 02I in I 960 , 0.17 in
1970, and it low point of 0 . 14 in I976. The lung run decline stopped in the mid - 1970s, after the oil shock, and
cr rose to 0.15 in 1980 and 0 . 19 in 1988. The rise in the dispersion was reversed in the last two years of the
198(1s and dispersion kept falling through 1992 . An interesting aspect of Figure 3 is that the behavior of the
cross- sectional dispersion of personal income net of transfers is very similar to the gross of transfers. In
particular , the dispersion of both concepts of income tell after 193 0 , rose between 1977 and 1988 and fell
hetween 1988 and 1992. This is true, even though the level of the dispersion is lower fur income gross of
transfers . I lence, it seems as it transters help reduce cross - state dispersion of per capita income. However,
interstate transfers are not responsible for the lung run decline in income dispersion.
The second row of " fable I report similar estimates for 47 Japanese prefectures for the period I955-
I987. "fhe first colunur correspond s to it single regression for the period 1955-1987. The estimated 13 coetticient
is 0.019 (s.e. =0004) with an adjusted R' of (1.59. The standar error of the regression is ((.0027. Table I uses
data starting in 1955 because income data by sector are not available before 1955. Income data, however, are
available for 193 0 . It we use the 1930 data. the estimated speed of convergence would he 9 .027 (s.e. =0003).
The good fit can also he appreciated in Figure 3. The evidently strong negative correlation between the
growth rate 1930 - 1987 and the log of income per capita in 1930 confirms the existence of /3-convergence
across the Japanese prefectures.
'Io asses s the extent to which there has been (r-convergence in Japan , we calculate the unweighted
cross - sectional stand ard deviation for the log of per capita income , 6, for the 47 prefectures from 1930 to
199(1. figure 4 shotis that the dispersion of personal income increased iron 0.47 in 1930 to 0 . 63 in 1940.
One explanation of this phenomenon is the explosion of military , pending during the period. The average
grotiih rate for Districts I (Ilokkaido-Tohoku ) and 7 ( Kyushu ), which are mainly agricultural , was -2.4'4
and 1.7', per se a r respectively . O n the other hand , the industrial regions of Tokyo, Osaka and Aichi grew at
3.71,(, 3. I (/ and I.71.4 per year respectively.
'fhe cross pretecturaI dispersion decreased dramatically since 1940. It fell to 0.29 by 1950, to 0.25 in
1960, to ((.23 in 1970 and hit it nrininunr ot0.125 in 1978 . It has increased slightly since then: (7
,
rose to 0.13
in 1980, 0 . 14 in 1985 and 0.15 in 1987 . Dispersion has been relatively constant ,nice then.
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Figure 3:
Convergence of Personal Income Across Japanese Prefectures
1930 Income and Income Growth 1930-1990
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Figure 4:
Dispersion of Personal Income Across Japanese Prefectures
1930-1990
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()ne popular cxpl:mation of the increase in dispersion for the 1980s is the take-off of the Inks ii region
from the rest of Japan. Since Tokyo was relatively richer at the end of the 1970s (average per capita income
in reaI terms for the Tokyo region was 2.(x)0 billion Yen and the average for the rest of Japan vas 1.75 1
billion Yens and guess faster during the 1980s (2.9514 a year versus 2.16W( it year) Nhich could explain this
apparent divergence. To check this point Burro and Sala-i-Martin ( 1992b) calculated the cross sectional
standard deviation of the log of per capita income for the seven Japanese Districts, and toi the six Districts
exclusive of Kanto-Koshin (which includes Tokyo). The exclusion of the Tokyo region shifts the cross
sectional variance doss ii fix all periods, but it does not change the general behavior of a over time. The
increase in dispersion during the 1980s is at it' the Tokyo region is included. but it is still increasing if
excluded. Thus, even though Tokyo contributed to the general increase in cross sectional dispersion during
the 198(k, its take off does not fully explain it.
Rows 3 to 8 in table I refer to convergence across European regions within eight countries ((ierntany,
France, United Kingdom. Italy. Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Spain). The first Toss relates to the
estimate of /3 for a sample of 4(1 years, 1950-1990, when xs e restrict the speed of convergence to coincide
across the 9(( regions and over time. The estimate, however, allows for country fixed effects. The estimated
speed of convergence is 0.015 (s.e.=0.002). The estimate of /3 when we allow each of the four decades to
have a fixed time effect is 0.031 (s.e.=0.004).
I^ignre 5 shows for the 90 regions the relation of the growth rate of per capita GDP (income per capita
for Spain) from 1950 to 1990 (1955 to 1987 for Spain). The values shown are all measured relative to the
means of the respective countries. The figure shows the type of negative relation that is familiar front the
t '.S. stairs and Japanese prefectures. The correlalion between the growth rate and the log of initial per capita
GDP in t'igure 5 is -0.72. Because the underlying numbers arc expressed relative to own-country means, the
relation in Figure 5 pertains to /3-convergence v,,ithin countries rather than between countries.
The estimates of the long sample for each of the five major countries (Germany, United Kingdom,
prance, Italy and Spain) are reported in the next five rows. The estimates range front 0.010 (s.e.=0.003) for
Italy to 0.(130 (s.e.-0.097) for the United Kingdom. The restricted panel estimates for the individual countries
are reported in column 3. Note that the individual point estimates are all close to 0.020 or 2`r a year. They
range from (1.(1148 fix hrancc to 0.0292 for the United Kingdom. The estimates for Spain are 0.023 (s.e.=0.(x)7 )
for the long sample and 0.019 (s.e.=((.004) for the restricted panel estimates with fixed time effects.
The final row reports the results for Canada as given by Coulonthe and Lee ( 1993( for the period 1961
to 1991. The estimate of /3 for the 30 year sample is 0.024 (s.e.=0.008).
Figure 6 shows the behavior of 6 for the regions within the largest five countries in tfte sample:
Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, France and Spain. The countries are always ranked highest to lowest-
Italy, Spain, Germany. France and United Kingdom. The overall pattern shows declines in 6I over time for
each country, although little net change occurs after 1970 for Germany and the United Kingdom. In particu-
lar, the rise in (T, front 1974 to 198(( for the l sited Kingdom -the only oil producer in the European sample-
reflects most likely the effect of oil shocks. In 1990, the values of 6 are 0.27 for Italy, 0.22 for Spain (this
value corresponds to 1987), 0.186 for Germany, 0.139 for France, and 0.122 for the United Kingdom.
The stain lesson front this subsection is that there is convergence both in the /3 and 6 sense across
regions of the U.S., Japan. Europe. Spain and Canada. The speed of /3 convergence is aniaiingly similar
across countries: about 2`, a year.
Conclusions
This paper has reviewed the empirical evidence on regional convergence. It has been argued that both
a and 13 convergence seem to occur in a variety of data sets. The speeds at which the regions of different
countries converge over different time periods is surprisingly similar: About 2Y( a year.
A variety of explanations which could account for these findings can he found in tfte literature. Some of
them xsrrc rejected and others not. Measurement error, price dispersion, and national public policies that
tried to induce convergence are not likely to he the underlying forces behind the observed patterns of
convergence. The one-sector models of endogenous growth are not going to explain these findings, even if
we amend them to include capital nobility or labor mobility. Endogeniiing the saving rate, the fertility rate
and the depreciation rate are potential ways to explain these facts, but are not found to he sarisfactorty.
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xmml" ov^^xp|xv..u,u'|^xu.vo^, "rti/utile o*v|,°",|model o^hwu( .vx^xcapital m.o.mv
The mode |Call be ,`m^eJ/"ixd11de me*t^m. Migration is |ikc|}m:^clemle I tic process of convergence
at (lie 0x*vr iCa| lCv'|, wot is l'Ound to be empirically unimportant.
xIII ^vg`/he uuv|xu^z|m^(tr|with oim.oi,hiog xxxnomopixJi`the m^*p^yobxnph nation kv
We c^ovurgewc,nmJiu*m mvuuoi^^ox|oyp"mr*van wvuumbe hard to reject "im/x^uix.ug wio,rv,.
The first one is the umvrig,m,of technology mmq',xthe Process Of vzxoou^1^^|oino^."x.l»,',euv^ is
tile Iwo-sector m'^h|of o^o»,x"u^growth. whose /mo^ih'm`arise in response to initial az/mm|imbalances
(tile imbalance ,n,u). |kmz. more research still needs to be done to pinpoint the exact omxnwtx,dynamic
pr ocess that explains the wuhhof regions.
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